





The	 lack	of	 fairness	 in	 asylum	 responsibility	 sharing	within	 the	EU	has	been	a	persistent	problem,	
which	has	 long	been	 ignored.	The	recent	 refugee	crisis	has	exposed	 the	 flaws	 in	 the	design	of	 the	
responsibility	 sharing	 system	more	 than	ever.	As	a	 response,	 a	number	of	 steps	have	been	 taken,	
including	 a	 proposal	 to	 reform	 the	 controversial	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation,	 which	 has	 been	 the	major	
reason	 of	 the	 inequalities.	 This	 article	 seeks	 to	 inform	 the	 ongoing	 debate	 on	 the	 existing	 and	
proposed	 solidarity	 instruments	 from	 a	 constitutional	 point	 of	 view	 by	 taking	 the	 principle	 of	
solidarity	and	fair	sharing	of	 responsibility	under	Article	80	TFEU	as	 its	 reference	point.	 It	explores	
the	 legal	 relevance	 of	 this	 principle	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 it	 can	 influence	 the	 legal	 landscape	 on	
asylum	responsibility	sharing.	The	article	sees	the	principle	as	an	important	mechanism	in	both	the	
enhancement	of	 solidarity	 and	 the	protection	of	 refugees.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 combined	 reading	of	
Article	 80	 TFEU	 and	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 provides	 a	 strong	 reason	 to	 doubt	 the	
constitutionality	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation.	 Despite	 its	 limited	 enforceability,	 the	 principle	 of	
solidarity	can	play	an	 important	role	as	an	 interpretation	tool	 in	defining	the	contours	of	solidarity	
obligations	imposed	under	secondary	legislation.	
Introduction	




allocation	 of	 competences	 and	 responsibilities	 between	 Member	 States	 on	 asylum	 manifestly	
infringes	the	principle	of	solidarity,	because	responsibility	 is	 imposed	upon	the	EU	country	through	
which	the	asylum	seeker	enters	the	area	without	internal	frontiers.	Thus,	responsibility	is	allocated	
by	 reference	 to	 the	 manifestly	 inadequate	 criterion	 of	 geography,	 with	 no	 mechanisms	 being	 in	
place	to	ensure	the	reallocation	of	responsibilities	among	Member	States.	To	quote	from	Advocate	
General	 Sharpston’s	 lucid	 characterisation	 of	 the	 present	 rules	 in	 Cimeda	 and	 Gista,	 ‘the	 whole	
																																								 																				






system	of	providing	protection	 for	 asylum	seekers	 and	 refugees	 is	predicated	on	 the	burden	 lying	
where	it	falls’.	2	
On	such	a	basis,	 I	 conclude	 that	 the	Court	of	 Justice	of	 the	European	Union	 (CJEU)	 should	declare	
invalid	 the	 key	 elements	 of	 Dublin	 III,	 as	 there	 are	 no	 functional	 mechanisms	 ensuring	 a	 proper	
allocation	and	reallocation	of	responsibilities	among	states,	resulting	not	only	lead	in	overloading	of	
the	capacity	of	some	Member	States,	the	inadequate	protection	of	the	rights	of	refugees,	and	at	the	
end	 of	 the	 day,	 the	 imperilling	 of	 free	 movement	 within	 the	 ‘area	 without	 internal	 frontiers’.	






the	 workings	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation.	 Section	 II	 makes	 the	 case	 for	 the	 European	
unconstitutionality	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation.	 I	 consider	 whether	 Dublin	 III	 is	 in	 breach	 of	 the	
principle	 of	 solidarity,	 and	whether	 such	 a	 breach	 could	 result	 in	 the	 CJEU	 declaring	 parts	 of	 the	























within	 the	 area	without	 internal	 frontiers,	 because	 today’s	 beneficiary	of	 asylum	 in	Ruritania	may	
eventually	 become	 tomorrow’s	 resident	 in	 Freedonia.	 Consequently,	 the	 abolition	 of	 internal	
borders	requires	a	coordinated	approach	to	the	control	of	the	external	borders	of	the	area	without	
internal	frontiers,	extending	to	asylum.	In	that	sense,	the	common	asylum	regime	is	the	stepchild	of	
to	 the	 abolishment	 of	 border	 controls	 within	 the	 European	 Union,	 or	 to	 be	more	 precise,	 of	 the	
Schengen	area.4	However,	 a	 system	based	on	 common	standards	would	not	operate	properly	 if	 it	
puts	more	 pressure	 on	 some	 states	 than	 others.	 It	 is	 at	 that	 point	 that	 functional	 and	 normative	




















called	 Dublin	 II	 Regulation	 in	 2003:	 ‘Council	 Regulation	 343/2003	 of	 18	 February	 2003	 establishing	 the	 criteria	 and	
mechanisms	 for	 determining	 the	Member	 State	 responsible	 for	 examining	 an	 asylum	 application	 lodged	 in	 one	 of	 the	
Member	States	by	a	 third-country	national’,	OJ	L	50,	of	25.2.2003,	pp.	1-10.	Rather	 small	amendments	were	enacted	 in	
2013,	 leading	 to	 the	 present	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation:	 ‘Regulation	 604/2013	 of	 26	 June	 2013	 establishing	 the	 criteria	 and	







asylum	 seekers	moving	 to	 another	Member	 State	 and	 being	 stopped	 by	 the	 local	 authorities,	 the	





The	 country	 of	 first	 entry	 rule	 establishes	 a	 relatively	 clear	 allocation	 of	 responsibilities	 among	
Member	States.	These	responsibilities	involve	costs,	related	not	only	to	the	maintenance	of	border	
controls	and	the	running	of	the	administration	of	the	asylum	system,	but	perhaps	more	onerously,	
also	 the	 material	 sustenance	 of	 asylum	 seekers8	 while	 their	 application	 is	 being	 processed.	 In	
addition,	 host	 states	 are	 required	 to	 acknowledge	 those	 who	 are	 granted	 refugee	 status	
fundamental	rights,	including	socio-economic	rights	(social	welfare,	healthcare,	and	housing,	among	
others).9		
The	 operationalisation	 of	 Article	 80	 TFEU	 seems	 to	 require	 not	 only	 a	 clear	 allocation	 of	





which	was	 introduced	not	by	coincidence	 in	 the	wake	of	 the	Kosovo	war.	However,	 reallocation	 is	
contemplated	 as	 an	 emergency	 measure,	 and	 indeed	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘sudden	 influx’	 has	 been	
construed	 in	an	exceedingly	narrow	way.10	Secondly,	 the	European	Asylum	Support	Office	may,	at	





9	 See	Chapter	VII	 of	 the	Directive	 2011/95/EU	of	 13	December	 2011	on	 standards	 for	 the	 qualification	of	 third-country	
nationals	or	stateless	persons	as	beneficiaries	of	international	protection,	for	a	uniform	status	for	refugees	or	for	persons	
eligible	for	subsidiary	protection,	and	for	the	content	of	the	protection	granted	OJ	L	337,	of	20.12.2011,	pp.	9-26.	
10	Directive	 2001/55/EC	of	 20	 July	 2001	on	minimum	 standards	 for	 giving	 temporary	 protection	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	mass	
influx	 of	 displaced	 persons	 and	 on	measures	 promoting	 a	 balance	 of	 efforts	 between	Member	 States	 in	 receiving	 such	






by	 deploying	 a	 support	 team	 that	 can	 provide	 an	 initial	 analysis	 of	 asylum	 applications.11	 Thirdly,	
some	very	modest	 funding	 instruments	have	been	 set	 in	place,	 so	 that	 the	 states	at	 the	 receiving	





instability	 in	 the	 Middle	 East	 following	 the	 US-led	 wars	 in	 Afghanistan	 and	 Iraq,	 plus	 structural	
political	 and	 economic	 unrest	 in	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	 were	 followed	 by	 an	 increase	 in	 numbers	 of	






the	 ground	 made	 it	 impossible	 to	 ignore	 that	 the	 presumption	 that	 all	 Dublin	 states	 were	 safe	
countries	for	asylum	seekers	was	too	optimistic	by	half.	In	its	famous	M.S.S.	decision,	the	European	



















13	M.S.S.	 v	 Belgium	 and	 Greece,	 Application	 no.	 30696/09	 (ECtHR,	 21	 January	 2011).	 The	 case	 concerned	 a	 protection	
seeker	 who	 entered	 Europe	 through	 Greece	 and	 travelled	 to	 Belgium,	 where	 he	 lodged	 an	 application	 for	 asylum.	 In	




to	 continue	 ignoring	 that	 not	 all	 Member	 States	 honoured	 their	 fundamental	 rights	 obligations.	
Consequently,	automatic	returns	conducted	on	the	basis	of	mutual	trust	were	based	on	very	shaky	
constitutional	ground.	Indeed,	shortly	after	M.S.S	ruling.,	the	CJEU	dealt	with	a	similar	case,	N.S.	and	
M.E.,	 also	 concerning	 the	mutual	 trust	principle.14	The	CJEU	concluded	 that	 fully	 automatic	 return	
might	put	into	risk	the	protection	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	asylum	seekers.	The	Court	favoured	a	
marginal	recharacterisation	of	the	principle.	There	should	be	no	automatic	return	if	the	transferring	
state	 could	 not	 be	 unaware	 of	 there	 being	 sysmetic	 deficiencies	 in	 the	 asylum	 procedures	 and	
reception	conditions	of	the	receiving	state.15	This	was	indeed	a	careful	balancing	act	on	the	side	of	
the	CJEU.	
Things	 only	 got	 worse	 once	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 financial,	 fiscal	 and	 economic	 crises	 that	 hit	 the	
European	Union	 from	2007	onwards	was	compounded	by	 the	growing	 instability	 in	 some	areas	of	
Northern	Africa	and	the	Middle	East	from	2011	onwards.	To	start	with	the	former,	the	impact	of	the	
financial,	 economic	 and	 fiscal	 crises	 on	 the	Member	 States	 of	 the	 European	Union	was	markedly	
asymmetric.	 It	was	 the	 Eurozone	periphery	 (especially	Greece,	 Portugal,	 Spain	 and	 Italy)	 that	was	
affected	most.	 Regarding	 the	 latter,	 the	 failure	of	 the	different	 ‘Arab	 springs’	 led	 to	open	wars	 in	
countries	such	as	Libya	and	Syria.	This	generated	a	massive	flow	of	asylum	seekers,	mostly	heading	
to	neighbouring	countries,	but	also	to	the	European	Union.	The	countries	that	were	worst	hit	by	the	
Eurozone	crises	 (and	especially	Greece	and	 Italy)	became	the	most	obvious	point	of	entry	 into	the	
EU	for	refugees,	even	if	the	preferred	final	destination	was	the	Eurozone	core	(especially	Germany	
and	Austria,)	 Sweden	and	 the	United	Kingdom.16	 The	 clustering	of	 asylum	 seekers	 overloaded	 the	
administrative	and	financial	capacities	of	the	countries	of	first	entry,	leading	not	only	to	a	renewed	
debate	about	the	unfairness	of	the	Dublin	system,	but	also	to	an	erosion	of	protection	standards	in	
the	 countries	 of	 first	 entry.	 In	 its	 turn,	 this	 generated	 massive	 flows	 within	 the	 Union,	 as	 the	
overloaded	countries	of	first	entry	had	a	clear	incentive	to	tolerate	asylum	seekers	making	use	of	the	
lack	 of	 internal	 borders	 to	 reach	 the	 countries	 of	 their	 preferred	 final	 destination.	 As	 a	 response,	





Malta,	 see	 UNHCR,	 ‘Asylum	 Levels	 and	 Trends	 in	 Industrialized	 Countries,	 2005’	 (UNHCR	 2006),	 available	 at	
http://www.unhcr.org/44153f592.html,	at	9;	UNHCR,	‘Asylum	Levels	and	Trends	in	Industrialized	Countries,	2009’	(UNHCR	
2010),	available	at	http://www.unhcr.org/4ba7341a9.html,	at	13.	
17	 For	 a	 list	 of	 Schengen	 countries	 that	 reintroduced	 border	 controls	 at	 their	 internal	 borders,	 European	 Commission,	








relocation	of	a	 total	of	160,000	asylum	seekers	 (40,000	 in	 the	 first	one,18	120,000	 in	 the	second)19	
from	Greece	and	 Italy	 to	other	Member	States.	The	UK,	 Ireland	and	Denmark	decided	not	 to	 take	
part	 in	 relocation	arrangements.	Slovakia	and	Hungary,	on	the	other	hand,	brought	actions	before	
the	 CJEU	 to	 challenge	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 second	 scheme,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 mandatory	 quotas	
defined	 according	 to	 the	Member	 States’	 relative	 absorption	 capacities.20	 At	 the	 time	 of	 writing,	
both	cases	concerning	asylum	responsibility	sharing	are	pending	before	the	CJEU.	
The	EU	has	also	made	use	of	rather	controversial	agreements	with	third	countries	to	overcome	the	
refugee	 crisis.	 An	 agreement	 was	 reached	 with	 Turkey	 on	 the	 return	 of	 irregular	 migrants	 who	
crossed	 from	 Turkey	 to	 the	 Greek	 islands.21	 The	 ‘temporary’	 programme	 covers	 the	 return	 of	
migrants	 and	 asylum	 seekers	who	 fail	 to	 apply	 for	 asylum	–	hoping	 to	move	 further	north	before	
lodging	an	asylum	application	–	and	those	whose	claims	are	rejected.	In	addition,	Turkey	is	expected	










18	 	Council	Decision	(EU)	2015/1523	of	14	September	2015	establishing	provisional	measures	 in	the	area	of	 international	
protection	for	the	benefit	of	Italy	and	of	Greece	OJ	L	239,	of	15.9.2015,	pp.	146-156.	




21	 EU-Turkey	 Statement,	 18	 March	 2016	 -	 Consilium’,	 available	 at	 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/.	
22	Proposal	 for	a	regulation	establishing	a	crisis	relocation	mechanism	and	amending	Regulation	(EU)	No	604/2013	of	26	
June	 2013	 establishing	 the	 criteria	 and	 mechanisms	 for	 determining	 the	 Member	 State	 responsible	 for	 examining	 an	
8	
	
envisages	 a	 broader	 reform	 of	 Dublin	 III,	 including	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 permanent	 emergency	
mechanism	that	would	relocate	asylum	seekers	according	to	mandatory	quotas.23		
All	these	developments	are	central	to	the	debate	about	the	contours	of	asylum	solidarity	in	the	EU.	
What	 is	 essential	 to	 make	 the	 asylum	 system	 function	 well	 and	 what	 is	 politically	 feasible	 are	
important	questions	that	are	likely	to	receive	most	attention.	However,	what	should	also	inform	the	
debate	 and	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 future	 asylum	 responsibility	 sharing	 system	are	 considerations	 of	
constitutionality,	which	will	be	discussed	in	the	next	section.	
II	The	constitutionality	of	the	European	asylum	system:	is	it	sufficiently	solidaristic?		




case	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 latter	 question	 is	 positive,	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 compliance	 so	 as	 to	 justify	 the	




asylum	 policy;	 (2)	 the	 limits	 of	 such	 discretion,	 and	 concretely,	 what	 constitutes	 a	 manifest	
infringement	 of	 the	 principle;	 (3)	 in	 what	 precise	 sense	 Dublin	 III	 might	 manifestly	 infringe	 the	
principle	of	solidarity.	
A)	The	margin	of	discretion	in	the	operationalisation	of	solidarity	
The	general	 and	abstract	 character	of	 principles24	 necessarily	 entails	 that	 the	margin	of	 discretion	
that	 the	European	 legislator	enjoys	when	operationalising	any	principle	 through	 the	enactment	of	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
application	 for	 international	 protection	 lodged	 in	 one	 of	 the	Member	 States	 by	 a	 third	 country	 national	 or	 a	 stateless	
person,	COM(2015)450	final,	available	at	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52015PC0450.	
23	Proposal	 for	a	 regulation	establishing	 the	 criteria	and	mechanisms	 for	determining	 the	Member	State	 responsible	 for	
examining	an	application	for	international	protection	lodged	in	one	of	the	Member	States	by	a	third-country	national	or	a	
stateless	 person	 (recast),	 COM(2016)	 270	 final,	 available	 at	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2016:0270:FIN	(hereinafter	Dublin	Reform	Proposal).	
24	The	term	 ‘principle’	 in	EU	 law	has	been	used	to	denote	a	wide	variety	of	norms.	See	on	this	point,	A.	Von	Bogdandy,	
‘Founding	Principles	of	EU	Law:	A	Theoretical	and	Doctrinal	Sketch’	(2010)	16	European	Law	Journal,	95-111,	104–105;	O.	
Wiklund	 and	 J.	 Bengoetxea,	 ‘General	 Constitutional	 Principles	 of	 Community	 Law’	 in	 U.	 Bernitz	 and	 J.	 Nergelius	 (eds),	





secondary	 law	 is	 wide.	 Consequently,	 the	 CJEU	 limits	 the	 intensity	 of	 its	 scrutiny	 in	 light	 of	 the	
margin	of	discretion	that	an	abstract	and	open-ended	legal	basis	grants	the	legislator	by	an	implicit	
obligation.25	 The	wide	margin	of	 discretion	has	been	 said	by	 the	CJEU	 to	 follow	 from	 the	need	 to	
strike	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 rights	 of	 individuals	 and	 the	 decision-making	 prerogatives	 of	 the	
institutions,26	 something	 which	 in	 the	 more	 explicit	 democratic	 idiom	 of	 national	 constitutional	
courts	would	probably	be	regarded	to	be	part	of	what	the	democratic	principle	requires.	
The	 margin	 of	 discretion	 that	 the	 European	 legislator	 enjoys	 when	 concretising	 what	 solidarity	
means	 in	 the	 context	of	 asylum	policy	 is	 very	wide,	 indeed	wider	 than	what	 is	 the	 case	 regarding	
other	principles	because	solidarity	is	an	essentially	manifold	and	contested	concept.	European	legal	
scholars	have	devoted	considerable	efforts	to	the	conceptualisation	of	European	solidarity27	and	to	
explore	 its	 nature	 as	 a	 legal	 concept,28	 very	 especially	 after	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 reaffirmed	 the	




distributed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 number	 of	 refugees	 being	 hosted,	 and	 including	 the	 adoption	 of	
																																								 																				
25	 For	 example	 in	 Racke,	 where	 the	 Court	 was	 asked	 to	 examine	 the	 validity	 of	 an	 EU	 regulation	 under	 a	 principle	 of	
customary	international	law,	the	Court	conducted	a	light-touch	review,	‘because	of	the	complexity	of	the	rules	in	question	











Constitutional	 Law	 (2nd	 Revised	 edition,	 Hart	 Publishing/Beck/Nomos,	 2010),	 11-54,	 53-54;	M.	 Ross	 and	 Y.	 Borgmann-
Prebil	 (eds),	 Promoting	 Solidarity	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 (Oxford	 University	 Press,	 2010);	 P.	 Hilpold,	 ‘Understanding	
Solidarity	within	EU	Law:	An	Analysis	of	 the	 “Islands	of	 Solidarity”	with	Particular	Regard	 to	Monetary	Union’	 (2015)	34	
Yearbook	of	European	Law,	257-285.	
29	At	 the	most	abstract	 level,	 solidarity	appears	 in	 the	preamble	of	 the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights,	where	 it	 is	 listed	
among	the	 ‘indivisible	and	universal	values’	on	which	 the	Union	 is	 founded.	 It	 is	also	mentioned	 in	 the	preamble	 to	 the	
TEU,	which	expresses	the	desire	of	the	Member	States	to	‘deepen	solidarity	between	their	peoples’.	In	addition,	solidarity	
is	 expressed	 in	Article	2	TEU	as	an	attribute	of	European	 society.	As	an	obligation,	 it	 appears	among	 the	general	Union	
objectives	 in	Article	3	TEU,	which	requires	the	promotion	of	not	only	solidarity	between	generations,	but	also	economic,	
social,	and	territorial	cohesion	and	solidarity	between	the	Member	States.	These	objectives	are	given	concrete	substance	




common	 policies	 as	 well	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 technical	 and	 administrative	 assistance.30	 It	 remains	
debatable	how	solidarity	is	to	be	put	into	effect.	Thus,	Article	80	TFEU	requires	that	solidarity	should	
extend	 to	 financial	 solidarity.	 Still,	 the	 Treaty	 is	 silent	 on	 what	 this	 entails,	 and	 how	 financial	
solidarity	 is	 to	 relate	 to	 the	 other	 dimensions	 of	 solidarity.	 Are	 responsibility	 and	 solidarity	 fully	
operative	only	during	emergencies?		
It	may	be	thought	that	some	clarification	may	be	drawn	from	a	systemic	construction	of	Article	80	
TFEU	 as	 a	 whole.	 According	 to	 the	 second	 part	 of	 the	 said	 article,	 asylum	 policy	 should	 be	 so	
designed	as	to	result	in	a	fair	sharing	of	responsibility	among	Member	States.	It	could	be	argued	that	
fairness	 somewhat	 amplifies	 the	 concept	 of	 solidarity	 and	 defines	 its	 nature	 and	 limits.	





solution	 is	 fair	 if	 it	 has	 been	 approved	 through	 a	 decision-making	 process	 in	 which	 all	 those	
potentially	 affected	 by	 the	 norm	 have	 had	 an	 equal	 opportunity	 to	 follow	 the	 debates	 and	 to	
participate	 in	 them	 as	 well	 as	 an	 equal	 chance	 of	 influencing	 the	 outcome.32	 Deciding	 which	




the	 relevant	 interests	 and	 the	 immediate	 policy	 consequences.	 When	 a	 provision	 allows	 the	




and	A.	 Suhrke,	 ‘Responsibility	 Sharing’	 in	 J.	 C.	Hathaway	 (ed),	Reconceiving	 International	Refugee	 Law	 (Martinus	Nijhoff	
Publishers,	1997)	83-109,	85–102	(providing	an	outline	of	responsibility	sharing	practices	at	international	level).	
31	J.	Rawls,	A	Theory	of	Justice	(Harvard	University	Press,	Revised	Edition,	2003),	53.	













The	 European	 legislator	 thus	 enjoys	 a	wide	margin	 of	 discretion	when	 operationalising	 principles,	
and	in	particular,	the	principle	of	solidarity	in	asylum	policy.	In	operational	terms,	the	CJEU	is	willing	
to	 undertake	 the	 review	 of	 European	 constitutionality	 of	 regulations	 and	 directives	 when	
discretionality	cloaks	arbitrariness.	The	key	concept	in	this	regard	is	‘manifest	infringement’.34	What	
accounts	 for	 a	 manifest	 infringement	 when	 testing	 the	 validity	 of	 legislation	 against	 a	 principle?	
What,	in	concrete,	accounts	for	a	manifest	infringement	of	the	principles	of	solidarity	and	fairness	in	
burden	sharing	regarding	asylum	policy?	
The	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	 CJEU	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 bright-line	 test.35	 However,	 it	 would	 be	 fair	 to	
argue	that	when	scrutinising	the	legality	of	a	legislative	act,	the	Court	conducts	a	light-touch	review	
by	giving	a	narrow	scope	to	the	obligation	in	question.	Italy	v	Council	is	one	of	the	cases	where	the	
Court	 employed	 the	 manifest	 infringement	 test	 when	 considering	 the	 validity	 of	 secondary	
legislation	 in	 light	 of	 a	 principle.36	 The	 case	 concerned	 a	 regulation	 adopted	 to	 allocate	 the	
percentages	of	total	allowable	catch	for	bluefin	tuna	among	the	Member	States.	Italy	contested	the	
regulation,	claiming	that	the	criterion	by	reference	to	which	the	allocation	was	made	was	manifestly	
inappropriate	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 relative	 stability.	 It	 was	 argued	 that	 the	
quotas	assigned	to	the	Member	States	were	based	on	data	from	one	year,	and	not	the	most	recent	
year,	 instead	 of	 being	 determined	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 catches	 of	 several	 years.	 Applying	 the	
manifest	infringement	test,	the	Court	gave	a	narrow	scope	to	the	obligation	imposed	by	the	principle	
of	 relative	 stability.	 According	 to	 the	Court,	 the	principle	 did	 not	 require	 the	use	of	 data	 of	more	
than	one	year	(even	if	in	the	case	at	hand	the	Council	had	used	data	from	two	years).37	The	manifest	
infringement	 test	 involved	 also	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 data	 relied	 upon	 by	 the	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
Tews	(eds),	Solidarität	in	der	Europäischen	Union	(Nomos	Verlagsgesellschaft,	2014),	143-162,	150	(arguing	that	an	action	






A.H.	 Türk,	Administrative	 Law	 and	 Policy	 of	 the	 European	Union	 (Oxford	University	 Press,	 2011),	 494–499;	 P.	 Craig,	 EU	










In	view	of	 the	previous	 two	subsections,	 the	constitutional	 review	of	 the	Dublin	 III	Regulation	will	
only	lead	to	a	declaration	of	unconstitutionality	(in	the	actual	parlance	of	the	CJEU,	to	a	declaration	




When	 configuring	 a	 responsibility	 sharing	 mechanism,	 the	 legislator	 enjoys	 a	 wide	 margin	 of	
discretion,	which	involves	for	example	the	determination	of	the	weights	of	different	components	in	
a	 distributive	 key.	 For	 instance,	 the	 proposal	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 quota-based	 relocation	
scheme	uses	an	allocation	key	composed	of	population	size	and	GDP	(40%	each),	the	unemployment	
rate	 (10%),	 and	 the	 average	 number	 of	 spontaneous	 asylum	 applications	 and	 the	 number	 of	
resettled	refugees	per	one	million	inhabitants	over	the	last	four	years	(10%).40	It	is	difficult	to	argue	
that	 this	 responsibility-sharing	 mechanism	 manifestly	 infringes	 the	 solidarity	 principle	 because	 it	
gives	more	weight	to	one	criterion	than	to	another.	Determining	the	relative	weight	in	the	allocation	
formula	 involves	complex	economic	and	social	calculations	that	necessarily	entail	 the	exercise	of	a	
certain	 degree	 of	 discretion,	 for	 example	 as	 to	 the	 methodology	 used.	 The	 legislator	 is	 well	
positioned	to	consider	competing	interests	and	make	an	informed	policy	decision	in	its	appraisal	of	
the	 relevant	 factors.	 It	 is	perhaps	possible	 to	argue	 that	another	 formulation	would	be	 fairer	 than	
the	 one	 proposed.41	 However,	 Article	 80	 TFEU,	 as	 a	 standard	 of	 review,	 does	 not	 ensure	 that	 an	
																																								 																				
38	 Ibid,	 para	 46-47.	 For	 a	 similar	 approach,	 see	 Case	 C-120/99	 NIPPO	 and	 Northern	 Ireland	 Fishermen’s	 Federation,	




40	For	 the	criteria	used	 in	 the	distribution	key	and	 their	weight	 see	 the	preamble	 to	 the	Proposal	 for	a	Council	Decision	
establishing	 provisional	 measures	 in	 the	 area	 of	 international	 protection	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 Italy,	 Greece	 and	 Hungary,	
COM(2015)	451	final,	available	at	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM:2015:0451:FIN,	recital	25.	On	
the	other	hand,	in	his	suggested	formula	of	GNP*1.5/population,	Grahl-Madsen	gave	more	emphasis	to	the	host	country’s	









optimal	model	 for	 the	 fair	 allocation	 of	 responsibilities	 is	 enacted.	 Its	 function	 is	 a	 different	 one,	
namely,	 to	 prevent	 the	 adoption	 of	 measures	 that	 are	 manifestly	 unfair.	 Therefore,	 even	 if	 an	
allocation	scheme	falls	short	of	what	fairness	requires,	the	said	scheme	is	not	necessarily	open	to	be	
declared	void	on	account	of	 it	manifestly	infringing	the	principles	of	solidarity	and	fair	sharing.	The	
infringement	would	only	be	manifest	 if	a	totally	 irrelevant	factor	would	be	taken	into	account	or	 if	
one	 clearly	 relevant	 is	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 no	 justification	 for	 such	 course	 of	 action	 is	
provided.	The	latter	is	a	good	description	of	the	Dublin	III	system.		





likely	 to	 be	 unevenly	 distributed	 depending	 on	 the	 actual	 geographical	 configuration	 of	 refugee	
flows.	Frontex	data	on	 the	migration	routes	 to	 the	EU	demonstrates	 that	between	the	years	2011	
and	 2015,	 out	 of	 2,426,152	 illegal	 border	 crossings	 including	 asylum	 seekers,	 43%	 were	 made	
through	the	Eastern	Mediterranean	route,	19%	through	the	Central	Mediterranean	route,	and	35%	
through	 the	Western	Balkan	 route.42	 The	 first	 entry	 state	 rule	 puts	 pressure	 on	 the	border	 states	
that	 are	 on	 the	more	 crowded	migration	 routes.	 Consequently,	 the	 accessibility	 of	 each	Member	




questionable	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 ineffectiveness	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 can	
compensate	 its	 unfairness.	 Its	 effectiveness,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 would	 mean	 more	 inequality	 in	
responsibility	 sharing.	 Thus,	 if	 anything,	 the	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 Dublin	 system	 proves	 its	
inappropriateness	 as	 a	 responsibility	 sharing	 mechanism.	 It	 is	 also	 worth	 mentioning	 that	 the	
suspension	 of	 Dublin	 returns	with	 a	 view	 to	 preventing	 further	 fundamental	 rights	 violations	 and	
more	recently	Germany’s	 (temporary)	open	border	policy	relieved	to	a	certain	extent	the	pressure	
																																								 																				
42	 Frontex,	 ‘Risk	 Analysis	 for	 2016’	 (Frontex	 2016),	 available	 at	
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf.		
43	 Eurostat,	 ‘Incoming	 'Dublin'	 transfers	 by	 submitting	 country	 (PARTNER),	 legal	 provision	 and	 duration	 of	 transfer	
(migr_dubti)’,	 available	 at	 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do;	 Eurostat,	 ‘Outgoing	 'Dublin'	 requests	 by	






Indeed,	 the	 country	 of	 first	 entry	 rule	 allocates	 responsibilities	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 arbitrary	
geographical	location	of	a	country	to	the	exclusion	of	factors	which	are	more	relevant	to	determine	
the	actual	relative	capacity	of	each	Member	State	to	deal	with	refugee	applications,	such	as	relative	
economic	 strength	 or	 demographic	 conditions.	 This,	 unsurprisingly,	 leads	 to	 considerable	 friction	
among	 Member	 States.	 For	 example,	 between	 2009	 and	 2015,	 Italy	 received	 260,620	asylum	





Can	 the	 country	 of	 first	 entry	 rule,	 which	 is	 clearly	 not	 the	 natural	 choice	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	
devising	of	a	rule	for	the	allocation	of	responsibilities,	be	justified?	Some	have	argued	that	it	can	be	
justified.	For	one,	the	Dublin	system	is	said	to	serve	the	 interests	of	the	refugees.	By	assigning	the	
responsibility	 for	 processing	 an	 asylum	 application	 to	 one	Member	 State	 (and	 one	Member	 State	
only),	 the	 Dublin	 system	 seeks	 to	 prevent	Member	 States	 from	 sending	 refugees	 back	 and	 forth,	
denying	jurisdiction	to	process	their	applications,	and	thereby	leaving	refugees	without	a	country	of	
asylum,	 i.e.	creating	refugees	 in	orbit.46	 It	 is,	however,	questionable	to	what	extent	 the	country	of	
first	entry	rule	serves	the	interests	of	refugees,	given	that	it	forces	the	asylum	seekers	to	remain	in	
countries	 where	 the	 asylum	 system	 is	 often	 under	 pressure	 and	 where,	 consequently,	 actual	
protection	standards	may	be	low.	If	the	purpose	is	to	avoid	refugees	being	left	without	a	country	of	
asylum,	 this	 could	 also	 be	 ensured	 by	 setting	 alternative	 criteria	 or	 centralising	 the	 review	 of	
applications	at	the	European	level	through	a	supranational	agency.47			
For	two,	the	Dublin	system	is	said	to	sustain	the	efficient	handling	of	asylum	claims.48	The	country	of	
first	 entry	 rule	 would	 enhance	 legal	 certainty	 and	 prevent	 the	 blockages	 that	 may	 result	 from	
‘asylum	shopping’,	i.e.	asylum	seekers	moving	from	one	jurisdiction	to	the	other	in	search	of	better	
																																								 																				




















is	 so	 because	 existing	 solidarity	 instruments	 are	 infused	 by	 a	 crisis	 mentality	 and	 largely	 seek	 to	
tackle	 emergencies.	 They	 are,	 therefore,	 incapable	 of	 eliminating	 inequalities	 in	 responsibility	
sharing	in	general.	Although	a	level	of	financial	assistance	has	been	made	available	to	the	host	states	
even	 in	 situations	 that	 do	 not	 amount	 to	 an	 emergency,	 these	 funding	 has	 been	 kept	 at	 purely	
symbolic	 levels,	 something	 that	 has	 not	 prevented	 from	 designing	 the	 said	 measures	 as	 purely	
temporary	 ones.51	 Similarly,	 the	 practical	 cooperation	 offered	 by	 the	 European	 Asylum	 Support	
Office,	 such	 as	 the	 training	 of	 judges	 and	 judiciary	 staff,	 is	 far	 from	 making	 any	 significant	
contribution.52	No	mechanism	exists	to	render	possible	the	relocation	of	asylum	seekers	or	refugees	
in	the	absence	of	an	emergency.	This	ignores	the	fact	that	inequality	in	responsibility	sharing	is	not	











53	 By	 way	 of	 example,	 suppose	 that	 one	 of	 two	 states	 with	 similar	 absorptive	 capacities	 receives	 around	 100	 asylum	
applications	each	year,	whereas	 the	other	 receives	20.	 If	 the	number	of	 applications	 continues	 in	a	 similar	manner,	 the	
discrepancy	 will	 increase	 gradually,	 deepening	 the	 unfairness	 in	 responsibility	 sharing.	 If	 the	 situation	 turns	 into	 an	
emergency,	there	is	a	possibility	that	an	ad	hoc	solution	will	be	developed.	However,	it	is	also	possible	that	a	Member	State	








was	 perhaps	 not	 sudden,	 but	 massive.54	 Likewise,	 the	 recent	 temporary	 schemes,	 which	 were	
devised	to	relocate	asylum	seekers	 from	Greece	and	 Italy,	have	been	adopted	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	
reflecting	 hard-ball	 bargaining	 rather	 that	 were	 inattentive	 to	 any	 consideration	 of	 constitutional	
principles	 (which	has	not	prevented	their	 ineffectiveness).55	The	Member	States	can	decide	on	the	
level	 of	 their	 contribution,	 or	 simply	 deny	 undertaking	 any	 further	 responsibilities.	 Take	 the	 new	




to	 reach	 any	 definitive	 conclusions	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 EU-Turkey	 agreement	 will	
contribute	 to	diminishing	 the	pressure	on	Greece.	However,	pinning	any	hopes	on	 this	agreement	
seems	 rather	 optimistic,	 considering	 especially	 that	 the	 system	 is	 based	 on	 a	 fragile	 deal	 that	
involves	 sensitive	 issues,	 such	 as	 visa	 liberalisation	 for	 Turkish	 citizens.	 In	 addition,	 even	 if	 the	
agreement	diminishes	illegal	entries	into	Greece,	it	is	likely	to	create	new	migration	routes	that	will	























another	 proposal	 in	 May	 2016,	 this	 time	 suggesting	 a	 reform	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation.58	 The	
Dublin	Reform	Proposal	retains	the	country	of	first	entry	rule	among	the	list	of	criteria	that	identify	
the	responsible	state,	but	it	also	envisages	a	permanent	emergency	instrument.	Yet,	unlike	the	first	




concerns	 that	 the	 country	 of	 first	 entry	 gives	 rise	 to.	 The	 proposals	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 not	
having	 a	 permanent	 emergency	 instrument	 and,	 therefore,	 represent	 an	 improvement	 on	 the	
current	system.59	However,	both	proposals	continue	 to	 reflect	a	certain	crisis	mentality	and	 fail	 to	
take	 into	 account	 that	 inequalities	 can	 arise	 in	 the	 absence	of	 a	 crisis.	 Thus,	 even	 if	 a	 permanent	
emergency	 instrument	was	adopted,	 it	 is	questionable	whether	the	fairness	demands	of	Article	80	
TFEU	would	be	met.60	
It	must	be	added	that	the	constitutionality	of	the	Dublin	system	can	be	challenged	also	on	account	
of	 the	 infringement	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 asylum	 seekers.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation	 on	
increased	 effectiveness	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 system	 runs	 counter	 to	 its	 objective	 of	 enhancing	
protection	 levels.61	 Mutual	 trust	 between	 Member	 States	 results	 in	 automatic	 returns,	
independently	of	whether	or	not	the	country	of	 first	entry	 is	actually	a	safe	state	(despite	the	fact	
that,	as	we	have	seen,	the	very	design	of	Dublin	III	creates	the	conditions	under	which	countries	of	
first	 entry	may	become	unsafe	 countries	 due	 to	 the	overloading	of	 their	 administrative	 capacities	
and	 the	 overstretching	 of	 financial	 resources).	 However,	 the	 rulings	 of	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	 CJEU	
demonstrate	 that	 the	Dublin	 system	 rests	on	 the	 rather	wishful	 presumption	 that	Member	 States	







relocation	 scheme.	 Both	 proposals	 allow	 the	Member	 States	 to	 withdraw	 from	 the	 relocation	 scheme	 for	 a	 period	 of	
twelve	months.	 The	 critical	 issue	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 repeated	withdrawals,	which	may	 effectively	 turn	 the	 system	 to	 a	
market	model.	Unlike	the	former	proposal,	according	to	which	the	Member	States	are	required	to	justify	their	withdrawal	












Yet,	 it	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 ECtHR’s	 decisions	 that	 automatic	 returns	 result	 in	 fundamental	 rights	
violations	even	in	the	absence	of	systematic	deficiencies.63		
As	 far	 as	 fundamental	 rights	 are	 concerned,	 the	 Dublin	 Reform	 Proposal	 is,	 if	 anything,	 a	 step	
backwards.	The	Proposal	seeks	to	 introduce	a	number	of	amendments	with	a	view	to	 increase	the	
effectiveness	of	 the	 returns,64	 something	which	has	 the	potential	 to	 increase	 the	 responsibility	on	
the	 border	 states	 and	 lead	 to	more	 fundamental	 rights	 violations.	 In	 addition,	 the	 new	 design	 of	
responsibility	sharing	under	the	proposal	relies	heavily	on	the	plan	to	return	asylum	seekers	to	‘safe’	
third	countries.	The	proposal	imposes	a	new	obligation	on	the	Member	States	to	check	whether	the	
application	 for	 international	 protection	 is	 ‘inadmissible’	 before	 applying	 the	 criteria	 defining	 the	
responsible	 state.65	 An	 application	 is	 inadmissible	 if	 the	 applicant	 is	 coming	 from	 a	 non-EU	 first	
country	 of	 asylum	 or	 coming	 from	 a	 ‘safe’	 third	 country.	 This	 raises	 serious	 concerns	 given	 the	
preparedness	of	the	EU	to	dilute	the	meaning	of	the	concepts	of	‘safe’,	something	which	can	be	seen	
at	 work	 in	 the	 EU-Turkey	 deal.	 Turkey	 retains	 a	 geographical	 limitation	 to	 the	 1951	 Geneva	
Convention	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees,	which	means	that	it	is	not	under	a	legal	obligation	to	
grant	 refugee	 status	 to	 non-European	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 accordingly	 is	 not	 bound	 by	 the	 non-
refoulement	principle	(i.e.	the	principle	of	not	returning	asylum	seekers	to	a	country	where	they	face	
persecution	 or	 danger),	 unless	 asylum	 seekers	 come	 from	 Europe.66	 Turkey	 has	 granted	 Syrian	
refugees	 a	 temporary	 protection	 status	 and	 allowed	 them	 access	 to	 basic	 rights.67	 However,	 it	 is	
questionable	 whether	 Turkey	 qualifies	 as	 a	 safe	 third	 country	 under	 EU	 law	 considering	 the	
protection	conditions	in	practice,	the	fact	that	protection	is	only	available	to	Syrian	refugees,	as	well	
as	 the	 poor	 track-record	 of	 Turkey	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights,	 as	
evidenced	in	the	case	law	of	the	ECtHR.68	The	fact	that	returns	under	the	EU-Turkey	agreement	have	
																																								 																				
62	 Shamso	 Abdullahi	 v	 Bundesasylamt,	 above,	 n.	 49,	 para	 60.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 the	 Court’s	 conviction	 of	 the	
significance	of	mutual	 trust	 in	 implementing	 the	Dublin	system	 in	 the	Court’s	opinion	on	 the	accession	of	 the	EU	to	 the	
ECHR,	where	the	Court	seems	to	be	troubled	by	the	idea	that	the	ECtHR	may	disregard	the	threshold	of	systematic	flaws	







66	 Reservations	 and	 Declarations	 on	 the	 1967	 Protocol	 Relating	 to	 the	 Status	 of	 Refugees,	 31	 January	 1967,	 United	
Nations,		Treaty	Series	,	Vol.	606,	at	267.	
67	 Temporary	 Protection	 Regulation,	 No.	 29153,	 Official	 Gazette	 20.10.2014,	 available	 at	
http://www.goc.gov.tr/files/_dokuman28.pdf.	
68	 To	name	but	 a	 few	 cases	where	 the	Court	 condemned	Turkey	 for	 infringing	 the	human	 rights	of	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees,	 see	 S.A.	 v.	 Turkey,	Application	 no.	 74535/10	 (ECtHR,	 15	 December	 2015);	 Ghorbanov	 and	 others	 v.	 Turkey,	
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preferences	 of	 the	 asylum	 seekers	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	host	 state.69	 In	 particular,	 the	 envisaged	
emergency	schemes	do	not	allow	asylum	seekers	to	choose	their	host	state,	and	thereby	prioritise	
fairness	 among	 the	 Member	 States	 above	 fairness	 towards	 asylum	 seekers.	 A	 fair	 solution	 to	
responsibility	sharing	should	also	be	informed	by	the	interests	of	asylum	seekers.	In	the	absence	of	a	
sound	 reason,	 disregarding	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 asylum	 seekers	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	
constitutionality	of	the	system	in	the	light	of	Articles	80	TFEU	and	Article	67	TFEU,	which	require	the	
establishment	of	a	common	asylum	policy	based	on	solidarity	between	 the	Member	States	 that	 is	
fair	towards	third	country	nationals.	
It	follows	from	the	above	analysis	that	the	Dublin	III	Regulation	does	not	only	have	practical,	but	also	
normative	 flaws.	 Article	 80	 TFEU	 and	 Article	 4	 of	 the	 Charter	 of	 Fundamental	 Rights	 constitute	








be	 relied	 on	when	 interpreting	 both	 primary	 and	 secondary	 EU	 law	 governing	 policies	 on	 border	
checks,	 asylum,	 and	 immigration.	When	 a	 provision	 concerning	 these	 areas	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	
different	ways,	it	should	be	constructed	in	the	light	of	Article	80	TFEU,	i.e.	in	a	way	that	gives	effect	
to	the	principle	of	solidarity	and	fair	sharing	of	responsibility.70		






national	 courts.	 See	 High	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 Queen’s	 Bench	 Division,	 The	 Queen	 v	 The	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Trade	 and	













were	asked	whether	 the	 sovereignty	 clause	 in	Dublin	 II	was	 to	be	 interpreted	 in	a	way	 to	allow	a	
Member	State	to	assume	responsibility	to	process	an	application	despite	the	fact	that	the	Regulation	
did	not	contain	any	provisions	concerning	the	application	of	Article	80	TFEU.	The	Court,	making	no	
mention	 of	 Article	 80	 TFEU,	 addressed	 the	 question	 by	merely	 stating	 that	 the	 application	 of	 the	
clause	was	 not	 subject	 to	 any	 particular	 condition.	 Relying	 on	 the	 preparatory	 documents	 of	 the	
Regulation,	the	Court	suggested	that	the	purpose	of	Article	3(2)	was	‘to	allow	each	Member	State	to	
decide	 sovereignly,	 for	political,	humanitarian,	or	practical	 considerations,	 to	agree	 to	examine	an	
application	 for	 asylum	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 responsible	 under	 the	 criteria	 in	 the	 Regulation’.72	 The	
question,	 however,	 was	 not	 whether	 a	 member	 state	 could	 process	 an	 application	 under	 the	
sovereignty	clause,	but	rather	whether	 it	should	do	so	under	certain	conditions.	The	CJEU	avoided	
deciding	 on	 whether	 the	 sovereignty	 clause	 should	 be	 read	 in	 conjunction	 with	 Article	 80,	 thus	
imposing	specific	obligations.	
B)	…	but	should	they?	
The	limited	use	of	Article	80	TFEU	in	the	case	 law	is	not	necessarily	 indicative	of	the	(lack	of)	 legal	
relevance	of	the	principle.	The	Court’s	reluctance	to	consider	solidarity	in	its	interpretation	results	to	
a	 certain	 extent	 from	 the	 contested	 character	 of	 the	 concept.	 Undoubtedly,	 a	 decision	 given	 on	
asylum	 solidarity	will	 affect	 the	whole	 system	of	 responsibility	 sharing,	which	 is	 a	 highly	 sensitive	
matter.	 Imposing	 solidarity	 duties	 through	 interpretation	of	 EU	 legislation	may	once	 again	 expose	
the	 CJEU	 to	 the	 criticism	 of	 judicial	 activism.	 It	 is	 not	 difficult	 to	 see	 why	 the	 CJEU	 preferred	 to	
resolve	 the	 issue	 through	 conventional	 and	 less	 controversial	 routes,	 rather	 than	 by	 relying	 on	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												






solidarity	where	 possible.	 However,	 it	 would	 be	wrong	 to	 conclude	 that	 solidarity	 is	 not	 a	 legally	
binding	 principle	 but	 merely	 a	 non-compulsory	 source	 of	 policy	 inspiration.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 its	
enforceability	 is	 limited	 because	 of	 the	 generality	 of	 the	 obligations	 it	 imposes.	 Limited	
enforceability,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	entail	that	a	norm	is	not	legally	binding,	even	less	so	that	
the	 norm	 does	 not	 have	 legal	 effects.73	 Despite	 its	 limitations,	 the	 principle	 of	 solidarity	 and	 fair	
sharing	of	responsibility	can	serve	as	a	standard	of	review	and	as	an	interpretation	tool.	It	should	be	
added	 that	 the	 secondary	 legislation	 through	which	 the	principle	 is	 implemented	has	been	 rather	
fragmentary,	and	accordingly	the	situations	where	the	principle	could	play	a	role	have	been	limited.	
The	principle	of	solidarity	can	become	a	more	influential	legal	tool	if	future	secondary	legislation	is	
adopted	 that	 facilitates	 the	 application	of	 the	principle,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 cases	where	 it	 can	be	
employed	to	substantiate	legislation	that	imposes	solidarity	duties.	
C)	The	case	for	a	different	interpretation	of	the	Temporary	Protection	Directive	
The	 solidarity	 principle	 can	 (and,	 I	 would	 argue,	 should)	 influence	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	
Temporary	 Protection	 Directive.	 The	 Directive	 has	 never	 been	 activated,	 although	 it	 has	 been	 in	
force	 since	2001.	 The	 solidarity	mechanism	provided	 for	under	 the	Directive	 is	 reserved	 for	 large-
scale	 refugee	movements.74	The	Member	States	have	not	shown	much	enthusiasm	for	 the	system	
when	 it	could	have	put	 into	use.75	Recently,	 Italy	unsuccessfully	sought	to	activate	the	Directive	 in	
response	to	the	arrival	of	a	high	number	of	asylum	seekers	(part	of	the	ongoing	refugee	crisis).76	In	
rejecting	Italy’s	call,	the	Council	members	argued	that	the	situation	in	Italy	did	not	amount	to	a	mass	





way	of	construing	 it?	 If,	alternatively,	 the	provision	 is	 read	 in	 light	of	 the	requirement	of	solidarity	
																																								 																				
73	A.	E.	Boyle,	‘Some	Reflections	on	the	Relationship	of	Treaties	and	Soft	Law’	(1999)	48	International	and	Comparative	Law	
Quarterly,	 901-913,	 907	 (suggesting	 that	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 clear	 obligation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 show	 that	 the	 law	 is	 non-
binding,	but	rather	that	it	is	softly	enforced).	
74	 The	 procedure	 to	 be	 followed	 under	 the	 Directive	 is	 somewhat	 cumbersome.	 The	 Council,	 acting	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	
proposal	 from	the	Commission	and	with	qualified	majority	voting,	 is	 first	 required	to	determine	the	existence	of	a	mass	
influx	situation	so	that	the	temporary	protection	scheme	can	be	activated.	Temporary	Protection	Directive,	Article	5.		
75	 On	 that	 point,	 see	 E.	 Guild,	 ‘Seeking	 Asylum:	 Storm	 Clouds	 between	 International	 Commitments	 and	 EU	 Legislative	
Measures’	(2004)	29	European	Law	Review,	198-218,	198.		
76	 	B.	Nascimbene	and	A.	Di	Pascale,	 ‘Arab	Spring	and	the	Extraordinary	Influx	of	People	Who	Arrived	in	Italy	from	North	








indeed	to	ensure	that	Member	States	 that	are	not	able	 to	meet	 the	needs	of	 the	new	arrivals	are	
assisted	by	all	 other	Member	States.	Whether	 the	 capacity	of	 a	Member	State	 is	overloaded	by	a	
sudden	mass	influx	or	by	a	continuous	influx	seems	rather	irrelevant	once	we	construe	the	Directive	
in	light	of	the	dual	obligation	to	act	in	solidarity	and	to	ensure	that	the	Union	as	a	whole	stands	true	
to	 its	commitment	to	protect	 refugees.	The	gradual	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	asylum	seekers	can	
also	 jeopardise	 the	 effective	 functioning	 of	 the	 asylum	 system	 of	 a	 host	 country,	 as	 could	 be	
observed	and	was	observed	above,	 in	 the	 case	of	Greece.	 Furthermore,	 the	mere	 reliance	on	 the	
number	of	displaced	persons	would	be	misleading	for	the	reason	that	the	number	of	refugees	is	only	





Soon,	 the	 Court	 will	 issue	 a	 decision	 on	 an	 annulment	 case	 brought	 by	 Slovakia	 and	 Hungary	 to	
examine	the	validity	of	the	Decision	establishing	the	emergency	relocation	scheme	for	the	relocation	




Article	78(3)	were	not	 fulfilled,	because	 the	adopted	measure	was	neither	provisional,	nor	did	 the	




two	years	as	 ‘provisional’	within	 the	meaning	of	Article	78(3).79	 The	predecessor	of	 this	provision,	

















of	 emergency	 situation.	 It	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 reconcile	 a	 narrow	 reading	 of	 the	 provision,	
establishing	 a	 high	 threshold	 for	 its	 use,	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	 applicants,	 with	 the	 principle	 of	
solidarity	under	Article	80	TFEU.	
Also	 interesting	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 the	 claim	made	 by	 Hungary	 that	 the	 Decision	 is	
disproportionate	because	 it	 imposes	obligatory	quotas	on	all	Member	States,	despite	the	 fact	 that	
some	(such	as	Hungary)	have	already	received	a	high	number	of	asylum	applications.81		






proportionality	 analysis	 (necessity).	 Although	 there	 are	 various	 ways	 to	 share	 responsibility,	 the	
relocation	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 is	 the	 most	 effective,	 especially	 when	 the	 concentration	 of	 asylum	
seekers	incapacitates	the	asylum	system	of	host	states.	It	is	hard	to	think	of	alternative	means	that	
would	 be	 equally	 effective	 while	 less	 abrasive	 of	 national	 autonomy.	 Financial	 assistance	
instruments	are	not	adequate	to	enhance	the	reception	capacity	of	a	host	state	or	address	structural	
inadequacies	in	the	short-term,	especially	when	high	numbers	of	applications	are	at	issue.	Similarly,	
the	 mandatory	 nature	 of	 the	 scheme	 can	 be	 justified	 on	 the	 ground	 that	 such	 character	 is	 a	










sustain	 when	 the	 Member	 States	 have	 full	 discretion	 regarding	 the	 level	 of	 their	 contribution.	
Hungary’s	 argument,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 seems	 to	 concern	 the	 last	 limb	 of	 the	 test,	 i.e.	
proportionality	in	a	narrow	sense	(i.e.	the	actual	balancing	of	the	competing	constitutional	interest	
at	stake).	The	question	here	is	whether	the	Decision	imposes	disproportionate	burdens	on	Hungary.	
The	 new	 scheme	 clearly	 requires	 Hungary	 and	 Slovakia	 to	 assume	 a	 larger	 share	 of	 the	 common	
protection	duties	 than	 they	have	done	so	 far.	At	 this	point,	 it	 is	useful	 to	 remember	 that	Hungary	
was	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 beneficiaries	 in	 the	 draft	 proposal	 of	 the	 Decision.83	 However,	 when	
Hungary	 withdrew,	 the	 Decision	 was	 adopted	 to	 benefit	 only	 Greece	 and	 Italy.	 What	 Hungary	
considers	as	manifestly	disproportionate	must	accordingly	be	the	additional	responsibilities	imposed	
by	 the	 relocation	 scheme	 (306	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 Italy	 and	 988	 from	Greece).84	 This	 argument	
remains	rather	weak,	given	that	the	quotas	are	defined	by	taking	account	of	the	relative	absorptive	
capacities	 of	 the	 Member	 States.	 The	 existing	 asylum	 applications	 are	 taken	 into	 account	 in	
identifying	 the	quotas,	which	 is	a	 requirement	of	 fairness	 in	 responsibility	 sharing.	The	scheme,	 in	









run	 if	 the	 Member	 States	 act	 as	 they	 see	 fit.	 Each	 national	 decision	 affects	 the	 area	 of	 free	
																																								 																				
82	 The	 project	 facilitated	 the	 relocation	 of	 a	 total	 of	 227	 beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection	 from	Malta	 to	 other	
Member	 States	 between	 2009-2011.	 Only	 six	 Member	 States	 took	 part	 in	 the	 voluntary	 scheme.	 See	 European	
Commission,	 ‘Communication	 on	 Enhanced	 Intra-EU	 Solidarity	 in	 the	 Field	 of	 Asylum.	 An	 EU	 Agenda	 for	 Better	
Responsibility-Sharing	 and	 More	 Mutual	 Trust’	 COM(2011)	 835	 final,	 available	 at	 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0835,	 at	 3.2.	 A	 second	 project,	 which	 was	 carried	 out	 from	 2011	 to	 2013,	 also	
showed	 little	 success.	 Although	 97	 places	 were	 pledged,	 only	 14	 persons	 could	 be	 relocated.	 Reported	 in	 European	







movement	as	a	whole.	 In	order	 to	preserve	 free	movement	 rights,	 from	which	all	Member	States	
benefit	in	different	ways,	it	is	necessary	for	all	to	accept	their	fair	share	of	responsibility	in	protecting	
refugees.	This	 is	not	only	a	practical	requirement,	but	also	a	constitutional	obligation,	enshrined	in	
Article	80	TFEU.	 It	 should	also	be	 remembered	that	providing	protection	 to	 refugees	 is	a	common	
concern	of	the	Member	States,	which	is	stemming	from	their	national	constitutional	traditions	and	
international	commitments	 (and	obligations)	and	which	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	Charter	of	Fundamental	
Rights.	No	matter	how	great	the	scale	of	the	crisis	 is,	the	solutions	cannot	undermine	the	rights	of	
asylum	 seekers	 as	 established	 in	 European	 constitutional	 law.	 Consequently,	 any	 decision	 on	
responsibility	sharing	should	be	 informed	by	the	principle	of	 fair	sharing	of	responsibly	and	by	the	
protection	of	fundamental	rights.	Indeed,	a	combined	reading	of	the	Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights	
and	Article	80	TFEU	 requires	an	understanding	of	 fairness	 in	 responsibility	 sharing	 that	 covers	not	
only	the	relationship	between	the	Member	States,	but	also	between	Europeans	and	asylum	seekers.	




a	 reform	 of	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation	 is	 not	 only	 a	 practical	matter,	 but	 also	 a	 constitutional	 and	
normative	one.	The	present	Dublin	system	of	allocating	responsibility	 falls	short	of	what	European	
constitutional	 law	 requires	 by	 manifestly	 infringing	 the	 principle	 of	 solidarity	 and	 fairness	 in	
responsibility	 sharing	 under	 Article	 80	 TFEU.	 Rather	 than	 using	 allocation	 criteria,	 which	 are	
obviously	relevant	to	determine	the	capacity	of	Member	States	to	host	refugees,	such	as	economic	
strength	 or	 population,	 the	 Dublin	 system	 makes	 of	 geographical	 location	 the	 key	 criterion	 to	
allocate	 responsibility.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 effective	 solidarity	 instrument	 capable	 of	 eliminating	
permanently	 the	 inequalities	 that	 the	 system	 creates,	 including	 in	 normal	 (non-emergency)	
situations,	 the	 Dublin	 III	 Regulation	 breaches	 the	 principle	 of	 solidarity.	 In	 addition,	 the	 current	
system	 overburdens	 some	 Member	 States	 and	 renders	 them	 incapable	 of	 protecting	 the	
fundamental	 rights	of	asylum	seekers.	Enforcing	the	Dublin	system	and	 improving	 its	effectiveness	
can	 perhaps	 address	 some	 of	 the	 most	 practical	 concerns	 raised	 by	 the	 Decision,	 but	 not	 the	
normative	 issues	 concerning	 its	 constitutional	 legitimacy.	 Regrettably,	 the	 proposal	 to	 reform	 the	
Dublin	III	Regulation	also	falls	short	of	complying	with	the	fairness	demands	of	Article	80.	Although	it	









to	 the	highly	 sensitive	nature	of	 the	matter.	However,	 political	 sensitiveness	does	not	 impair	 that	
solidarity	and	fairness	in	responsibility	sharing	are	constitutional	principles,	and	as	such	have	to	be	
factored	in	the	application	and	interpretation	of	EU	asylum	law.		
The	 recognition	 of	 the	 unconstitutionality	 of	 the	 current	Dublin	 system	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 a	
reformed	EU	asylum	acquis	under	Article	80	TFEU	may	alter	not	only	 the	balance	of	 responsibility	
between	the	Member	States,	but	also	in	the	asylum	system	in	general.	This	may	create	momentum	
in	 developing	 a	 common	 system	of	 asylum	based	 on	 the	 joint	 processing	 of	 applications	within	 a	
centralised	scheme	rather	than	by	individual	Member	States	and	responsibility	sharing	going	beyond	
crisis	management	to	sustain	fairness	both	among	the	Member	States	and	towards	asylum	seekers.	
	
